Abstract-Weighted voting games are mathematical models, used to analyse situations where voters with variable voting weight vote in favour of or against a decision. They have been applied in various political and economic organizations. Similar combinatorial models are also encountered in neuroscience, threshold logic, reliability theory and distributed systems.
I. INTRODUCTION A. Motivation
Weighted voting games (WVGs) are mathematical models which are used to analyze voting bodies in which the voters have different number of votes. In WVGs, each voter is assigned a non-negative weight and makes a vote in favour of or against a bill. The bill is passed if and only if the total weight of those voting in favour of the bill is equal to or greater than some fixed quota. A power index attempts to measure the ability of a player in a WVG to determine the outcome of the vote. WVGs have been applied in various political and economic organizations for structural or constitutional purposes. Prominent applications include the United Nations Security Council, the Electoral College of the United States and the International Monetary Fund ( [1] , [2] ). The distribution of voting power in the European Union Council of Ministers has received special attention in [3] , [4] , [5] and [6] . Voting power is also used in joint stock companies where each shareholder gets votes in proportion to the ownership of a stock ( [7] , [8] ). WVGs are also encountered in threshold logic, reliability theory, neuroscience and logical computing devices ( [9] , [10] ). Nordmann et al. [11] deal with reliability and cost evaluation of weighted dynamic-threshold votingsystems. Systems of this type are used in various areas such as target and pattern recognition, safety monitoring and human organization systems.
The calculation of voting powers of the voters, which is NP hard in all well known cases [12] , has been extensively researched in the last few years and has interested computer scientists ( [13] , [14] ). However, the inverse problem of designing a WVG with a desirable distribution of power has received less attention. In this paper, we present an efficient algorithm to compute a corresponding integer vector for a given vector of Banzhaf indices. This is a natural extension of the work on the method of generating functions to compute voting power indices. The algorithm is designed as a ready-made tool to be used by economists and political scientists in their analysis of WVGs. The tool is planned to be accessible from [15] . This algorithm has better performance than any other known to us. We have looked at designing multiple weighted voting games The coalitions in which player 1 is critical are {1,2}, 2 {1, }, {1, 2, 3}. Therefore r,i = 3.
The coalition in which player 2 is critical is {1, 2}. Therefore T12 = 1.
The coalition in which player 3 is critical is {1, 3}. Therefore T13 = 1. Consequently, /1 = 3/5, /2 = 1/5 and 3 = 1/5.
The generating function method provides an efficient way of computing Banzhaf indices if the voting weights are integers [17] .
III. DESIGNING WEIGHTED VOTING GAMES A. Outline and Survey
The problem of designing WVGs can be defined formally as follows:
Given a real number vector P = (P1, .. . , Pn), the target Banzhaf indices for the n players, some appropriate Errorfunction and a small positive real c, compute the corresponding real approximate weights w = (wl, .. ., wn) such that Error(P, P(w)) < c.
The problem of designing WVGs was first discussed in [4] and [18] . Holler et al. [18] proposed an iterative procedure with a stopping criterion to approximate to a game which has a voting power vector almost equal to the target. The method was to choose an initial weight vector wo and use successive iterations to get a better approximation: wr+l = wr + A(d -P(wr)) where A is a scalar and P(wr) is the power vector of wr.
The approach has been used to analyse the Council of European Union and the International Monetary Fund Board of Governors.
Not every power distribution is feasible and might not have corresponding weights for it. There are some unexplored questions concerning the convergence of the vector, such as whether the iteration always converges to the right region. It is also critical to design systems with desirable properties.
Carreras [19] points out factors considered in designing simple games. The focus is different from the computation of powers and weights. By focusing on the protectionist tendency found in the design of voting games, the role of blocking coalitions is analysed in a simple game. Similarly, complexity results in designing simple games are provided in [20] . They show that it is NP-Complete to verify the 'stability' of a simple game.
B. Algorithm to design weighted voting games
We provide a more effective hill climbing approach than the previous proposed algorithms. Our Interpolate by using a best fit curve to get the new real voting weights. 5: Repeat Step 2 until the sum of squares of differences between the powers and the target powers is less than the required error bound.
The appendix provides the Mathematica code for Algorithm 1. For the given input in the appendix, the algorithm converges and achieves an error of 1.481 in a single iteration.
C. Algorithmic and Technical Issues
The main action of the algorithm is to use the generating function method to compute voting powers of estimated voting weights in a limited number of iterations. The generating function method is an elegant and efficient combinatorial method to compute Banzhaf indices of players with integer votes and has a pseudo-polynomial time complexity in the number of players. Bilbao et al. [17] prove that the computational complexity of computing Banzhaf indices by generating functions is O(n2C) where C is the number of nonzero coefficients in Hli<i<n(1+xwj). Since for each player i, we check the coefficients of all terms in Bi(x) ranging from Xq-Wi to q-1 , we have tried to find moderate voting weights to limit the computational complexity. The normal distribution approximation has been used to get an initial estimate of the voting weights. Leech [21] also uses the multi-linear extension approach in approximation of voting powers. One concern is the extra error induced when the interpolated weights are rounded off. Ideally, we will want the positive and negative differences in rounding to be balanced. The likelihood of this balance increases as we use more players. However if the above mentioned problem arises, we might choose to round weights with fractional parts near 0.5 in such a way as to restore the balance. Some insight from the apportionment literature promises to shed light on how to deal with this technical issue. We are also looking for fresh computational approaches to apportionment. An overview of apportionment is available in [22] .
D. Performance and Computational Complexity
As mentioned previously, the computational complexity of computing Banzhaf indices by generating functions is O(n2C) where C is the number of nonzero coefficients in H11<i<n(1 + xWj). We can approximate the number of iterations required based on the number of significant figures required in our final solution. However for practical purposes, our algorithm is giving an error of less than 10-8 for 30 players after only 3 iterations.
IV. DESIGNING EGALITARIAN VOTING GAMES
Designing egalitarian voting games is a pertinent issue in resource allocation and also political bodies. Felsenthal and Machover [23] have obtained the following result for a two-tier voting system based on Penrose's seminal paper [24] . Vni, the square root of its population, and establishing a quota rule equal to (1 + Zn,' )/2 makes the voting rule almost egalitarian. Although this voting method appears to be elegant and transparent, Algorithm 2 provides an alternative in which we can change the quota to accommodate various levels of efficiency in making a decision. 
VI. CONCLUSION & OPEN PROBLEMS
This paper provides an algorithm which will be useful for practitioners in the voting power field. This has various applications because of the ubiquitous nature of WVGs, e.g., in reliability theory. Moreover we analyse computational considerations which will be of interest to computer scientists and engineers. We notice that our algorithm can be used to design egalitarian twotier WVGs and also to find a representative WVG for multiple weighted voting games.
It is an interesting problem to analyse multiple voting games as a function of their constituent single WVGs. Moreover Slomczynski et al. [25] have created interest in the effect of the quota on WVGs. A deeper analysis of the effect is required.
